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This study investigates the hiding of matrimonial property by dishonest spouses in trusts or
companies to frustrate the rights of the other spouse to the same property. The frustration of
such rights usually takes place during divorce proceedings. The objective of the study is to
highlight the importance of the issue, and offer a critique of the Kenyan legal system' s ability
to resolve It. Where Kenya cannot effectively deal with the problem, recommendations will
be made on how the legal system cou ld be improved to do so. The study is conducted mainly
through a comparative study of legislation and case law from South Africa and England,
since there is a lack of local jurisprudence and information on the issue. The majo r find ings
were that Kenya's IEgal system in fed he ghtened the dangers sought to be avoided.
However, the arguments raised in South Africa and England show that Kenyan courts still
have adequate powers to resolve the problem, notwithstanding legislation drafted without
prior consideration of the issues highlighted in the study. It is recommended that certain
provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act be amended by providing for specific powers of
the COUlt in the distribution of matrimonial property, and that the powers grant wide
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CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction to the Study
1.1. Background to the Problem
MarriageIaNS in Kenyaspal farther beck thanthe country' S indepeadence in 1963,
beginning with the Maniage Ordinance of 1902 . I Matrimonial property was governed by the
Manied Women Property Act 1882 of England which was received into Kenyan law on 15t
August 1897 as a statute of general application.' The statute was repealed only recently by
the Matrimonial Property Act' of 2013 , which aims to "provide for the rights and
responsibilities of spouses in relation to matrimonial property" .4
At first glance, matrimonial property and trust property appear to be vastly differing
legal regimes of law. The Matrimonial Property Acr' itsel f states that "trust property,
including property held in trust under customary law, does not form part of matrimonial
property" ." However, where property rights are concerned, they become linked where each
regime gives different parti es claim to the same property. The law of trusts began to take
effect in Kenya on the 18th of Augus t 1897 ,7 wh en the common law system wa s received as
pari of the laws of Kenya.
There is a growi ng trend in South African courts where courts are inc reasingly "going
bellind the trust form"S to dete rmine wh ether assets within them form part of matrimonial
property, If the answer is positive, the court will ignore the entire trust ," and proceed to
redistribute the property in the trust between the spouses.l?
Trusts are not the onl y entities to be affected. In England and Wales (hereinafter
"England") , companies have also been under siege. II Where it is suspected that matrimonial
property is hidden in a company, the court ma y I pierce the ve I' of incorporation, or at
minimum look behind the veil. ':' In the former, the court disregards the separation of owner
1 Marriage Ordinance of 1902.
~ I v I [2008] EWHC 1167 (Fam).
3 (No. 49 of20 13)
4 Preambl e to the Matrimonial Property Act (No. 49 of 2013 ).
5 (No . 49 of20 l3).
6 Section 6(2), Matrimonial Property Act (No . 49 of 2013).
7 Judic ature Act (No . 16 of 1967) .
S De WaaJ MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or: "Going BEhind the Trust Form" )' , 76(4) The Rabel Journal of
Comparative and International Private Law (20 12),2.
9 De WaaI MJ, 'The A buseof the Trust (or: "Going BEhi nd the Trust Form") ' , 2.
10 Badenhorst v Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA ), para 13.
I I Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34 .
l ~ Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34 para, 28 .
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or controller of the entity treating them as jointly liable, while in the latter the court onl y
peels back the cover to reveal the true owner or controller of the entity. 13
These radic al actions by South African and English courts are ill response to
dishonest spouses who seek to use the legal principl es of trust or company law to defeat or
frustrate the enforcement of their form er spouses matrimonial property rights.!" It may at
first appear that the holding of property within a trust or company is legitimate, for example
in a trust for tax and other economic advantages, but later becomes malicious when the
marriage turns sour. 15 Thi s study argues that despite the lack of local jurisprudence on the
issue , the principles used by South African and English courts may be applied under Kenyan
law in the interests of justice.
The stud y will begin by outlining the legal framework of matrimonial property in
Kenya, before examining cas es of dishonest spouses who attempt to hid e property in trusts
and companies. Th e circumstances of the claims are limited to the end of a marri age through
divorc e. Divorce is important to the study since in all the cases studied, it is the main reason
for dishonest spouses to hide matrimonial property. 16 Whether the spouses were married in
community of property or separate property, und er a prenuptial agreement, both perm itted
under the Mat rimo nial Property Act17 is also inves tigated.
The principled approach to the problem taken by South Africa n and English courts
will then be outlined, while reviewin g the circumstances in which the courts may go behind
or pierce the veils of trusts and compani es respectively. The study will then conclude with
recommendati ons on how to best appl y the principles to existing circumstances in Ken ya.
As there is little available information on the subject, the research methodology will
involve a compara tive study of cas e law and legislation on matrimonial property law from
South Africa and England . Th e selected jurisd ictions are South Africa, which has dealt with
the issue in question in relation to trusts, and the England , which has dealt with companies.
The theoreti cal franevork ra iEd on in this study is that of "j usti ce as faimESS" as
framed by John Rawls and Aristotle. The concept of justice is often a key consideration of
courts in determining the need to investigate ent ities where matrim onial property is alleged
to be hidden.
13 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limi ted and others [2013] UKSC 34 para, 28.
I ~ Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [20 13] UKSC 34, para 28.
is IVT & others v KT(933/20 13) [2015] ZASCA 9.
i6 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34; Badenhorst v Badenhorst [2006] 2 All
SA 363 (SCA) ; Jordaan v Jordaa n and 3 Others [2012 ] HC; Bell Hashem v Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115.
17 Section 6(3) , Matrimonial Property Act (No. 49 of20 13).
12
1.2. Problem Statement
In a trust, there is a separation between legal ownership by the trustee and the
beneficial ownership by the beneficiary. IS In companies , there exists a separate legal
personality from the person. Section 2 of the Companies Act' ? ofKenya provides that natural
persons may incorporate as entities with perpetual succession. This entity is considered
separate and distinct form the persons constituting it. 20 Thus, where one spouse hides
matrimonial property in a trust as a trustee, or in a company, any claim to the property made
by their former spouse is frustrated .
This is because the spouse hiding the property can raise the defence that the y have
no individual light to distribute the property should a court make an order against them
personally for redistribution of the property. In many cases however, the dishonest spouse
has some form of de fac to control of the trust or company that allows them to control the
hidden matrimonial property as if the y had the individual rights to do SO .21 The dishonest
spo use the refore use s the separation of beneficial ownership in a trust, and the separate legal
entity concept of a company, mere y as a f ront to fr ustrate or defeat the r forme- spouse's
rights to the property.
Yet, South African and English courts have found wa ys to go behind the trust form
or pierce the veils of companies, respectively, to mete out j ustice between the parties ." In a
trust, going behind the trust form effective ly ignores the existence of a valid trust to distribute
the property held in it.23 For companies, piercing the veil ignores the separation of the legal
personalities of the company and the dishonest spouse." Where it is found that the dishonest
spouse is indeed in control of the matrimonial property subject to distribution, the cour ts
ma y go behind the trust or pierce the corporate veil to grant relief to the innocent spouse .
IS De W aaJ MJ, 'The Ab use of the Tr ust (or: " Going Behind the Tru st Form" )' , 11.
19 (Ac t No. 17 or 2015) .
20 Salomo n \' Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.
21 Badenhorst v Badenhorst [2006] ~ All SA 363 (SCA) , par a 9.
22 See, Bad enhorst v Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 13, and Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited
and others [2013] UKSC para 34; respectively.
23 De WaaJ MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or: " Going Behind the Tru st Form" )' , 2.
24 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limi ted and others [2013] UKSC 34, para 34.
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Despite the growing jurisprudence in South Africa and England, Kenyan courts and
lawmakers are yet to reco gnise and apply the principled approaches used in othe r
jurisdictions to resolve such issues.
1.3. Research Questions and Objectives
1. What are the laws governing matrim onial property in Kenya?
2. Ho w do dishonest spo uses hide matrimonial property in trusts or companies?
3. Can a spouse make a claim to matrimonial property held in tru sts and companies, and
under what circum stanc es can a court go behind the trust or pierce the corporate ve il to
give redres s?
4 . What conclusions findings and recommendations can be made fro m the principles
applied in Sou th Africa an d England? How can they be applied to the Kenyan context?
1.4. Theoretical Framework
The guiding theoretical franevork is based on the theory of "j usti ceas fa! mess" as
propo sed by John Rawls. The sa me theor y is also proposed by Aristo tle. Ju stice is a key
concep t forming the core of the study. Each time a court determines whe ther a spouse has a
claim to prop erty, there always ari ses a qu est ion of wha t is just as between marri ed partners,
even where prmupti a! agr89Tlents are present. John Ravvl s' concepti on of j usti ce r6\l01 Ve3
around the idea of wha t is "fa!r" . Fa!mESS is taken to be foundati ona! , and a precursor to
forming the princ iples of just ice.25
Aristo tle prop osed the same not ion ofjusti ce in his work N icomachean Ethics (Book
IV). He divid ed the idea of justice into two, one of them being justi ce as being "fa!r end
Equal" .26 Aristo tle held that justice is a vir tue in all persons who must possess a sen se of
fa irness in ma king goo d judgem ent - a virtue of importance to those who rul e and judge.27
Further , fairness enco mpassed an idea of equa lity , to give a spec ific example, equa lity before
the law despite an y difference between two pers ons.
These two ideas ar e observable in court jurisprudence re lating to matt ers of
matrimonial prop ert y. The case ofKivuitu v KivlIit1l28 held that non-fin ancial contribution to
pro perty gave rise to rights towards such prop erty. This of course co nforms to Rawls idea of
fa!mESS with r~ards to the "uneconomi e" househol d Iabour often put in by wives. 29 The
~5 Sen A, The Idea of Justi ce, Pengui n Book s Ltd, Let-don, 2010,55 .
~6 Solomo n R and Murp hy M, What is Justice, Oxford University Press, 1990, 38.
~7 Solomon and Murphy, What is Justice, 39.
~ s [199 1] KLR 248 .
~9 Kivuitu I' "Kil'ui/ll [199 1] KLR 248.
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case of WMM v BML 30 conformed more closely to Aristotle's idea of justice. It noted that:
II the rightsenshri ned in.. .Arti d e [45(3) of the Constitution] oonnote Equal ity of parti esina
marriage and are intended to ensure tha t neither spouse is superior to the other in relation to
enjoyment of personal rights and freedoms" .31 This proposes the idea that under Kenya's
matrimonial laws , spouses have equal rights to property acquired in marriage. Such equ ality
serv es the aim of fairness as a basis for justice between spouses.
1.5. Literature Review
1.5.1. Defining Matrimonial Property
Matrimonial propert y in Kenya is defined as :31
(a) the matrimonial home or homes;
(b) household goods and effects in the matrimonial home or homes; or
(c) any other immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired during
the subsistence ofthe marriage.
This sets out a community of prop erty regim e, wherein the spouses share all property
acc ruing fro m the beginning of the marriage to its possible end through divorce. A separate
prop erty regim e is also provided for whe re the parties agree to it. Section 6(3) states that the
part ies to an inte nded marriage may enter into an agreeme nt before their marnage to
determ ine their prop erty rights.f
The Ac t further provides that: II trust property. ind uding property he din trust under
custo ma ry law, does not form part of matrimonial property" .34 As will later be argued, this
p rovision ma y be detrime ntal to the innocent spouse from whom the matrimonial prop erty
is hidden. It onl y reinforces the arguments made by a dishonest spouse: that the proper ty
hidd en in the trust canno t be consid ered when dist ributing matrimoni al prop erty. Moreover,
the aspect of trust property II he d urder customary law" 35 brings to mind the dis crimination
and disen franchisement of wo men thro ugh custom ary law practices.l '' Th ese practices often
30 [20 12] eKLR.
31 wuu V BML [201 2] eKLR.
3~ Section 6( I) , Matrimo nial Property Act (Act No. 49 of 20 I3).
33 Secti on 6(3) , Matrimo nial Prope rty Act (Ac t No. 49 of 20 13).
34 Section 6(2), Matrimonial Prope rty Act (Act No . 49 of20 13).
35 Section 6(2), Matrimonial Property Act (Ac t No. 49 of2013) .
36 Kimani EN & Maina LW, ' Older Women's Rights to Property and Inheritance in Kenya : Cu lture , Po licy,
and Disenfranchisement' 19 Jo urnal ofEthnic & Cultural Diversity in Socia! Work (20 I 0), 259 .
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dictated that, to a large extent, only men could hold, access and control property." As will
be highlighted in this study, each case brought before the South African and English courts
involved husbands hiding matrimonial property from women. A provision protecting
customary practices may result in the continuance of customary discrimination with the
support of modem matrimonial laws.
InSouth Africa, the Matrimonial Property Act of 198438 also prescribes two regimes
for matrimonial property: (i) marriage in community of property and , (ii) out of community
of property, i.e. separate property. Marriage out of community of property can in some
circumstances be subject to South Africa's unique accrual system.'? In the accrual system,
although property is separate, the spouses are entitled to an equal share of the accrual or
growth of their estates during the subsistence of the marriage.t" At the end of a marriage, a
spouse experiencing no growth or lesser growth has a claim to an equal share of the growth
experienced by the other spouse." The application of the accrual system is dependent on any
prenuptial agreements between the spouses.F However, other than outlining the two
different regimes, the South African Matrimonial Property Act of 1984 does not expressly
define matrimonial property. Matrimonial property can thus be deduced to be any property
held by the spouses under the community of property regime, or any accruing assets where
the marriage is under the separate property regime but subject to accrual. A spouse will only
be able to make a claim where property from any of these two situations is hidden in a trust
or company.
Our focus in the United Kingdom will be England and Wales (" England") which are
governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act. 43 Scotland in contrast has its own Family Law
Act.44 The Matrimonial Causes Act45 also does not expressly define matrimonial property.
Instead, it gives the court wide discretion to make any order it finds appropriate relating to
3; Kimani EN & Maina LW, ' Older Women's Rights to Property and Inheritance in Kenya: Cu lture, Policy,
and Disenfranchisement', 258.
38 Matrim onia l Prop erty Act of 1984.
39 Sect ion 2, Matrim on ial Property Act of 1984 .
~o 'Clement 1vlarumoagae: The beginning of the end - dissolution of marriage under accrual system' De Rebus,
29 June 2015 http://www.derebus.or g.za/the-beginn ing-of-the-end-dissolution-of-marriage-under-accrua1-
system! on 7 February 201 7.
~ I Section 3, Matrimonial Property Act of 1984 .
42 Section 2, Matrimonial Property Act of 1984 .
~3 1973, Chapter 18.
~~ 1985, Chapter 37 .
~ ; 1973, Chapter 18.
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prop ert y of spouses in a m arriage." Section 24(1 ) provides that a court may make "order
that a party to the marri cge shall ·trcnsfe- to the other party... such property as may be so
specified, be ing property to which the first-mentioned party is entitled, ei ther in possession
or reversion" .47 This effectively means that a court may distribute property to whi ch
dishonest spouse is entitled, to the innocent spouse whom they sought to disenfranchise.
Furthermore, Section 25 provides that" it shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether
to exercise its powers under secti on...24 ... to have regard to all the circumstances of the
cas e" .48 These circumstances include the " income, EErning capacity, property and other
financial resources which each of the pa rties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable fu ture" .49
These wide pow ers which may be exercised by the English cou rts thus provide an
adequate safety measure for the acti ons of dishanest spouses. Unl ike Kenya's Matri moni aI
Property Ac t, it widens the powers of the court with rega rd to matrimonial property as
opposed to creating mor e barriers to property in held in trusts or companies. It wi ll later be
dem onstrated that the wide discretion of the courts is key to resolving the issue of dishones t
spouses hiding matrimoni al prop ert y.
1.5.2. Background to Trust Law
A trust is defined as a relationship under equity in whi ch a se ttlor, who creates the
tru st, ves ts his or her prop erty in a pe rson or persons known as a tmstee(s).50 The trus tees
are charged by the se ttlo r w ith a legal dut y to hold the prop erty for the be ne fit of a third
person or persons known as ben eficiari es.5I The effect of a tru st is that the tru stee becom es
the leg al ow ne r of a property.52 The trustee holds the legal title of the prop erty in the eyes of
the law, and has the right to use and dispose of the prop erty as anyone w ith abso lute
ownership of the prop ert y co uld do.53 However, because of the cha rge placed on the se ttlor
on the tru stee, the ben efici ary is the only one all owed to benefit fro m the prop erty, and holds
thi s benefit in equity.54 The separa tion between legal ownership, or control, of the prop erty
46 Prest v Petrode! Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34, 3.
47 Sectio n 24( 1)(a), Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Chapter 18.
45 Sec tion 25(1) , Matrimonial Causes Act 19 73, Chap ter 18.
49 Sect ion 25(2)(a), Matrimo nial Causes Act 1973, Chapte r 18.
50 Bakibinga D, Equity and Trusts, Law Afr ica Publishi ng (K) Ltd, Nairobi, 2011 , 176.
5 1 Bakibinga , Equity and Trusts, 176.
52 Warner-Reed E, Equity and Trusts, Pearso n Education Limi ted , London , 20 11, 15
53 Wa rne r-Reed, Equity and Trusts, 15.
54 Warner-Reed, Equity and Trusts , 15.
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- of the trustee - and beneficial ownership or enjoyment - by the beneficiary - is what
creates a trust. 55
This study will focus on instances of abuses of the trust form , which enables spouses
to hide matrimonial property. An abuse arises when a trustee attempts to have both control
and enjoyment of the trust property. 56 In carrying this out , a trustee may give no regard to
the existence of the trust and treat trust property as his or her own.57 Essentially, but for the
trust form , the property would be vested in the trustee. 58 Thus, where matrimonial property
is hidden in a trust, the dishonest spouse as trustee controls access and other rights to the
property for his or her own benefit. This benefit is not for any purpose of the trust , and
specifically to the detriment of the former spouse's rights.
1.5.3. Background to Company Law
At law, companies are separate legal entities from the persons that incorporate
them. 59 This was the general rule set out in the case Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd.60 The
case involved the liquidation of the company A Salomon and Co Ltd , which was
incorporated by a Mr. Salomon. Mr. Salomon who also sold his sole proprietorship to the
company?' . TIle liquidator brought suit on behalf of the company to cancel payouts for
debentures held by Mr Salomon claiming Mr Salomon used the company as his agent to
carry out business without risk on his part'" . The House of Lords stated that no action
claiming Mr Salomon and the company were one and the same could be brought. The House
of Lords state:J that" if the company was a real company, fulfilling all the requirements of
the Legislature, it must be treated as a company, as an entity, consisting indeed of certain
co-operators, but a distinet and indeoendent corporati on" .63
This separation between the company and those who incorporate it became one of
the central points of hidden matrimonial property in the case of Prest v Petrodel Resources
Limited and Others.64 In this case before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC),
the former husband had hidden a matrimonial home behind the company Petrodel Resources
55 Warner-Reed, Equity and Trusts , 15.
56 De WaaI MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or : " Going Behind the Trust Form")' , 14.
57 De WaaI MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or: " Going Behind the Trust Form") ' , 14.
58 De WaaI MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or : "Going Behind the Trust Form")' , 14.
59 Sa /OIllOIl v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 , P 27.
60 [1897] AC 22.
6 1 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, P 23 .
6c Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, P 26.
63 Salomon v A Sa/01l1011 and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, P 27.
6~ [2013] LJ KSC 34 .
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Limit ed which he controlled. The intended effect was that where an act ion was brought
against him, much like Mr. Salomon, he could claim that he was wholly separate from the
company and had individual power to transfer all or part the value of the property to his
former wife.
This separation between owner or controller of the comp any, and the company itself
is also present under Kenyan company law. The Companies Act65 provides that one or more
natural persons may II incorporate as entl tiES wi th perpetua successi on" ,66 so long as the
entity is formed and registered under the Companies Act. 67
1.6. Hypothesis
It is hypothesised that based on the interests of ju stice, spous es have a claim to
matrimonial property held in companies and trusts under Kenyan law; notwithstanding the
rigidity in legislation, or lack of court jurisprud ence in Kenya as compared to South Africa
and England.
1.7. Justification of Research
The core of the Matrimonial Property Act68 lies in Section 6 which provides exactly
what constitutes matrimonial property in Kenya. It is noted however. that section 6(2) hastily
brushes aside trust property as being entirely separate from matrimonial property.
Considering the issues highlighted regarding matrimonial property hidden in trusts in other
jurisdictions, and the possibility of such occurrences in Kenya, it appears that such a
provision leaves room for an avoidable mischief. A strict application of Kenyan law could
allow a dishonest spouse to hide matrimonial property within a trust, and the innocent spouse
would have no claim considering Section 6(2).69
Although no other jurisdiction makes spec ific provision for companies, their court s
are granted wide powers that allow them to make orders with respect to matrimonial propert y
hidden in companies . The legislative gap in Kenya in this respect is however understandable,
given the low occurTence of such mischief in Kenya. Considering this, there exis ts a need
for a comparative study on the occurrences of this mischie f in South Africa and England and
the principles applied by South African and English courts to curb it. The aim of this study
65 (Act No. 17 of20 15).
66 Section 2, Companies Act (No. 49 of 20 13).
67 Section 3, Companies Act (No. 49 of20 13).
68 (No. 49 of20 13).
69 Matrimonial Property Act (No . 49 of 2( 13).
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is to form a practical guide based on the legislations and jurisprudence in South Africa and
England , in the hOPES that it maybe cppl ied to gaps inKenya' s I~a f ranework.
1.8. Research Scope and Study Limits
In considering the circumstances in which spouses have rights towards property held
in compani es and trusts , the study considers the types of marriage under Kenyan law. These
are set out under Section 6(1) of the Marriage Act. 70 The circumstanc es of the cla ims are
limited to the end of a marriage through divorce. Mo reover, the matrimon ial property system
prevailing in the marriage is also considered. That is, whether the spouses were married in
community of property, or separate property through a prenuptial agreement; both of which
are permitted und er the Marriage Act."
Trusts and companies are studie d due to the high occ urre nce of their use to hide
matrimon ial property. Trusts allow a dishonest spouse to separate their legal ownership of
the property and their beneficial ow ners hip such that they main tain control as trustees, but
no clai ms may be made against property owned as the beneficial ow ner. Co mpanies on the
other hand create a separate legal entity that dishonest spouses rely on to claim that they
have no form of ow ners hip or control ove r the ma trimo nial pro perty. However, they often
cont rol the compa ny itse lf through management to reap personal benefits from the property
owned by the company.
1.9. Research Methodology
Th e study was conducted mainly throu gh a comparative study of legislation and case
law from South Africa and England. This is a preferable method as there is little available
local information on the subject, mo st especially in terms of judicial decisions . The
jurisdictions of interest are South Africa, and England and Wales in the Uni ted Kingdom .
These jurisdict ions were selected as the questions raised in the study have arisen and been
examined by thei r courts .
Primary sources of info nnation for the study included the Constitution of Kenya and
local statutes relating to matrim on ial property. Statu tes relating to matrimon ial property in
Kenya, and the chosen jurisdictions for the comparative study, further we re primary sou rces
of information. The required legislat ion was accessed online through government websites
where they are readily ava ilable. Th ese set out the legal position in Kenya as we ll as other
jurisdictions relevant to the study . Second ary sources included boo ks, journal art icles and
70 (No.4 of20 14).
71 Section 6(3), Matrimonial Property Act (No. 49 of 20 13).
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local case law together with case law drawn from South Africa and England for comparison.
Journals were accessed online through online journal websites such as JSTOR and Oxford
Journals, while case law was readily found online on government websites. The required
books were obtained from local libraries in Kenya.
The study was conducted mainly through desk research as a majority of the required
information was easil y available online. The study involved a qualitative analysis of the
cases, legislation and prior analyses made in journal articles. First, the Kenyan legislative
framework is analysed to understand the local approach to property in marriag e. Second , a
description of how partn ers use trusts and comp anies to hide property is given. Finally, an
analysis is made on how the South African and English jurisdictions have resolve claim s to
matrimonial property hidden in trusts and companies. The analysis is carri ed out by
reviewing legislation and courts cases in the two jurisdictions, and making a comparative
analysis with Kenya s lEgislation and any similar cases, Journal ar ticles that have
commented and analyse the legal positions in South Afr ica and England wi th also be used
in the comparative analysis of the jurisdictions in relation to Kenya. This final analysis then
aids in making conclu sions, finding s and recommendations that may be applied in Kenya to
address local legislative gaps on the issue.
1.10. Chapter Breakdown
a) Chapter One - Introduction to the Study
The first chapter will provide the founda tion of the study and shall includ e the
background the problem, the probl em statement and research questions, the
theoretical framewo rk, literature review, hypothesis, the scope and limits of the
study, as well as the research method ology.
b) Chapter Two - Legal Framework of Matrimonial Property in Kenya
The second chapte r exam ines the current legal framework for matrimonial property
in Kenya. In line with this, the historical development of this area of law is also
discussed.
c) Chapter Three - Hiding of Matrimonial Property in Trusts and Companies
This chapter considers cases in which dishon est spouses have hide property III
companies and trusts. It also exami nes the common methods of hiding property by
partners and the motiva tions for such methods prior to and during divo rce
proceedings.
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d) Chapte r Four - Spousal Claims to Property in Trusts and Companies, and
Judicial Justifications for Going Behind the Trust or Piercing the Corporate
Veil
This chapter considers the possible claims the innocent spouse may have to
matrimonial property hidden behind trusts and companies as outlined in chapter
three. It further investigates the jurisprudential arguments and circ umstances that
allow South African and English courts to go behind trusts, or to pierce the corporate
veils of companies, respectively, to settle claims by the innocent spouse.
e) Chapter Five - Conclusions, Findings and Recommendations for Application to
the Kenyan Context
This final chap ter considers the findings from chapters three and four, and makes
conclusio ns on the research questions and hypothesis. The closing reco mmendations
are drawn from the principles applied in South Africa and England to settle the
problem of hiding matrimonial property in trusts and companies. Each
recommendation is directed at closing gaps iden tified in Kenya ' s legislative
f rernevork and attempts to bolster KEnya's ability to respond to the issues raised in
the research ques tions.
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CHAPTER TWO:
Legal Framework of Matrimonial Property in Kenya
2.1. Introduction-
In discussi ng the current I~a1 f ranevork governi ng Kenyas matrimoniaI property
regime , it is important to outline the historical developments that led to its creation. On the
face of it, legislation and case law in Kenya appears to employ western ideas of matrimonial
property stemming from statutes of general application and case law from courts in England.
How ever, upon closer inspection, stron g cultural and religious ideas of matrimonial property
have remained matters ofconsideration to lawmakers and judges alike. Cultural and religiou s
conceptions of matrimonial property, they were of great importance to the 1968 Commission
on the Law of Ma rriage and Divorcef (1968 Commission) which sought to streamline
matrimonial laws in Kenya after independence.P The permeation of these considerations
into the law each have their own consequences on the division of property in marriage .
2.2. Historical Development of Matrimonial Property Law in Kenya
Formal laws on marria ge in Kenya began in 1897 when the East Afri ca Order in
Council applied Indian and Brit ish Acts and common law in force at the time 7,1 .
No twithstanding, African custo mary laws and their corresponding matrimonial property
laws were already in existence ." The British system of governance in colonized terri tories
began with reception statutes that stipulated sources of law and their internal hierarchy."
The Marriage Act77 was enacted in 1902 and provided for Chri stian and Civil
marriages." The Act further recognized customary maniages79 while providing that a
T2 Commission on the l aw of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commissio n 0 11 the L(Il\' ofMarriage and
Di vorce, August 1968, 5-6_
13 Commission on the l aw of Marriage and Divorce. Report oj the Commission 0 1/ the Law ofMarriage and
Divorce, August 1968_
7" Commission on the law of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on the Law ofMarriage and
Divorce, August 1968, 8.
75 Muigai G, 'Women and Property Rights in Kenya' in Mbeo MA and Ooko-Ombaka 0 , Women and Law ill
Kenya , Public l aw Institute , Nairobi, 1989_
76 Kang'ara SW, ' Beyond Bed and Bread: Mal(ing the African State Through Marriage Law Reform -
Constitutive and Transformative Influences of Anglo-American Legal Thought' Compara tive Law Review
(2012), 6_
77 Marriage Act (Act No. 30 of' 1902).
78 Commission on the l aw of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission 0 11 the Law ofMarr iage and
Divorce, August 1968, 9.
79 Section 37, Marriage Act (Act No. 30 of 1902).
cus tomary marriage was an im pediment to a statutory marriage.P This was an important
development as the polygamous nature of customary marriages inherently contradicted the
common law conception of Civi l, and indeed Christian, marriages."! The Native Christian
Marriage Ordinance'" was passed in 1904 to ease the formalities of Civil and Christian
marriages under the Marriage Act for Afri can Christians .P The Ordinance was late r replaced
by the African Christian Marriage and Divorc e Act8-l which appl ied optionally in relation to
the Marriage Act if either of the parties to the marriage professed the Christian faith.85
islamic law, an important aspect of matrimonial laws in Kenya, was at the time
recognized as operating only within the IOvmile coastal strip that was administered as part
of the Protectorate. The Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Registration Act86 allowed
Bri tish legisl ators to extend the ir adm inistrative reach by requiring the registration ofIslamic
marriages.V The Act appl ied to " to any a'ea or to any tribe sect or co mmunity within any
arEE" and "a l native MohammEdans in the mainland dominions of H.H. the Sultan of
Zanzibar and the Suitanate of W itu" .88 The Act however faced legal cha llenges. Although it
sought to provide for the regi stration of Islamic marri ages, it was held in case of Fatunia
binti Athunta v. Ali Bakc/' " that islami c marr iages, not being held under the Marriage Act
were "not in accordsnce with the law of the Frotectorete' ." The 1968 Commission
comments that this was likely the motive behind pass ing the Mohammedan Marriage,
Divorce and Succession Act'" wh ich acted retrospective ly to va lidate all ex isting Islam ic
. . 1/ Q,marna ges In xenya. :"
so Section 11(1)(d), Marriage Act (Act No. 30 of 190 2).
S I See Hy de v Hyde [1866] LR I r &D 130, where the court held that Civil marriages fo llow the Christendo m
conce ption of marriage whic h is the marri age to one partner, for life, to the excl usion of all others.
S2 Nat ive Christian Marriage Ordinance (No. 9 of 1904).
S3 Co mmiss ion on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Report 0/ the Commission 0 11 the Law ofMarriage and
Divorce, Aug ust 1968, 9.
S~ African Christian Ma rriag e and Divorce Act (Act No. 5 1 of 1931).
S5 Comm ission on the Law of Marri age and Divorce, Report of the Commissio n on the Law ofMa rriage and
Divorce, Aug ust 1968, 10.
S6 Moha mmeda n Marriage and Divorce Regis tration Act (Ac t No. 13 of 1906).
S7 Co mmission on the Law of Marr iage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on the Law ofMarriage an d
Di vorce, Aug ust 1968, 10.
ss Commis sion on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on the Law ofMa rriage and
Divorce, Aug ust 196 8, 10.
S9 Fatuma binti A thuma v. AIi Baia [191 8] 7 EAL R 171.
90 Fatuma binti A thuma v. Ali Bak.i r191 8] 7 EAL R 171. .
9 1 Mo hammedan Marriage, Divo rce an d Succ ession Act (Ac t No . 34 of 1920).
92 Co mmission on the Law o f Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on tire Law ofMarriage and
Divo rce, August 1968, 11.
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Hindu marriages were recognised by the Hindu (Marriage, Divorce and Succession)
Ordinance'" in 1946 . 9. ~ This Act also applied retrospectively validating all existing Hindu
marriages, while additionally providing for matrimonial reliefs ." This was later replaced by
the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act96 whi ch required Hindu marri ages to be monogamous
and reliefs to Hindu marriages we re provided for under the Matrimonial Causes Act97 and
the Subord inate Courts (Separation and Maintenance) Act.98
Customary marri ages however, were largely ignored by the colonizers, and held to
be inva lid as classical legal thou ght cast Afr ican and European conceptions of famil y as
irreconcilable" Moreover , to supplant African customary laws , English legal sense and
positions on morali ty applied variedly and unpredictably.l ' " Interest ingly, classical legal
thought oppose d state regula tion of the fami ly in the West, categorizing it as a private
institution ,10I yet co lonizers did afford the same protection to co lonies and instead
considered the No n-wes tern famil ies pre-modem and therefore not within the protect ive
cover of" the private".102 However, by 1930-1950, a shift in legal though occurred following
findin gs that non-western peoples had sophisticated institutions for self-governance. 103 To
ease [he costs of governing larg e territo ries wi thout giving up control to local communities ,
the colonizers created native courts . It thereafter appointed the judges of the cou rts and
regulated their j urisdiction. iO.j The Native Courts Regulation s of 1987 105 were passed and
9.~ Hindu (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Ordinance (No . 43 o f. 1946).
9~ Commiss ion on the Law of Marr iage and Divorce, Report 01 the Commission on the Law ofMarriage (file!
Divorce, Aug ust 196 8, 11.
95 Commiss ion on the Law of Ma rriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriag e lind
Divorc e, August 1968, 11.
96 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act (L N 142/1 963, LN 2/1964). All Ord inan ces subs isting on 12th December
1963 , were restyled Acts by LN 2 of 1964.
97 Matrim onial Causes Act (Act No . 33 of 1939).
98 Subordinate Courts (Separation and Maint enance) Act (Act No. 34 of 1928) .
99 Kan g' a-a, ' Beyond Bed and Bread: Making the African Sta te Through Marriage Law Reform - Con stitutive
and Tra nsfo rmat ive Influen ces of Ang to-A rned ca n Lega Thought', 5.
IOU Kang' ara, 'Beyond Bed end Bread: Making the African State Through Mcuiage Low Reform _.Co nst itutive
and Tr ans forrn ati ve Influ en ces of Anglo-A meri ca n Lega T hough t' , 5.
10 1 Ma-e! !a MR, ' Critical Family Low' American Univers ity Journal ofGender, Social Policy & the Law
(20 11), 722.
102 Kan g' ara, ' Beyond Bed end Bread: Making the African State Through Ma-riage Low Reform - Constitu tive
and Trans formative Influences of Anglo-A meri ca n Lega Thought', 5.
103 Keng ' ara, ' Bey ond Bed end Bread: Mak ing the,'\ fr ican State Through Ma- riage Low Reform - Constituti ve
and Transformative Influences of Anglo-American Lega Thought' , 6 .
10 1 Keng ' ara, ' Beyond Bed end Bread: Making the African State Through Ma-ri age Low Reform - Constitutive
and Transfo rrna tive Influ ences of Ang lo-A merican Lega Thought' , 6 .
lOS Native Courts Regulations 1897 (No. 15 of 1897).
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made to apply to the" personal status" of" native Christiens" as well as "natives not
prof essing either the Christian or the Mohamm edan f aiths" ./06 Through these proc esses,
customary law was in part formali zed , bureaucratized, and left vulnerable to systemic
incoherence, evidenced by inconsistent judicial findings on the validity of customary
marriages as per western conceptions of law and mo rality.107
2.3. Forms of Marriage and Property Regimes Post-Independence
2.3.1. African Custom my Marriages
Under customary ma rriages, women do not own property. IDS In fact, women do not
own property exclusively of their ow n at any point in their lives.' '" and in many
comm unities, wo men could not inh erit from their fathe rs. I 10 Unwed adult dau ghters hav e
rights of usage under thei r fathEr'S Iands and upon marri age; any property she brings with
her to the marriage comes under the ownership of her hu sband. I II These ge ne ral mles
however did not apply to regis tered prop erty which is protected by formal prop erty law . l l l
As a resul t of the husband's cui tura appropri at ion of his wi fe's property, the questi on of
division of matrimonial property did not arise at the end of a marri age.l !' The wo ma n was
effective ly dispossessed of any property and was meant to rel y on the social protect ion of
returni ng to her fathers home. I 1-1 However, these tradition s are unl ikely to be applied in their
pure form und er modem matrim oni al prop erty reg imes.
2.3.2. Islamic Marriages
Islamic marri ages hold an interesting dichotom y in terms of the prop erty held by
spo uses . Women maintain their indiv idua lity much in the same way as was later developed
in oommon law . HEr legal personalty is not rnerqed with her husband's and hEr property
remains her ow n. I IS Moreover , any interfere nce by the husband w ith her exclusive co ntro l
over her prope rty is co ns idered cru elry and ma y suffi ce as a rea son to dissolve the
106 Regulation 64, Native Courts Regulations 1897 (No . 15 of 1897).
lOi Kang'ara, ' Beyond Bed and Bread: M aking the African StateThrough Marriage Law Reform - Constitutive
and Transformati ve Influences of Ang lo-A rne'icen Lega Though t', 6.
lOS Muigai G, 'Women and PropertyRights in Kenya' , 115.
109 Ki age PO, Family Law ill Kenya: Marriage, Divorce and Children, Law/vfr ica, Nairobi; 2016, 243-242.
110 Kiage , Fami ly L[I\ I' ill Kenya : Marriage, Divorce and Children, 243.
II I M uigai , 'W omen and Property Rights in Kenya' , 115.
112 Muigai , 'W omen and Property Rightsin Kenya' , 115.
113 Kiage, Family Law ill Kenya: Marriage. Divorce and Children , 242 .
I I . K iage, Family Law i ll Kenya : Marriage, Divorce and Children, 242.
115 Muigai, ' Women and Property Rights in Kenya' , 116.
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marriage.l!" Yet despite thi s strong protecti on for a women's individua property,
matrimonial property itself is always held by the husband, and no propri etary interest can be
gained by the wife - although she maintains access, use and enjoyment rights while the
marriage subsists .117
Evidently, the purel y Islamic position on matrimonial property contradicts the
statutory and case law developments that have com e about. The 1968 Commission noted
that although Islam is regarded as a complete way of life by the Islamic community, it was
still
" ...necessary to enact laws whi ch restri ct the appl icati on of 151 amiclaw. ..marr iage
and divorce and the structure of the f amily are matters which vitally concern the
State and we do not think that the fact that they are also intimately bound up with
religion would j ustify or excuse the State abdicating its responsibility" .II S
A final point of interest however arises from the case for Essa v Essa. 119 In this case ,
Omollo JA continued the Court of Appeal practice of applying the English Married
Women's Property Act 1882 as a statute of general application in Kenya. He further had
that the Married Women's Property Act 1882 was aso applicable to Muslims in Kenya.
Authors have commented that this was an implicit rejection of the application of the
principles of Islamic law to matrimonial property.120 However, this position appears to have
been reversed by the Matrim onial Property Act which provides that all persons" professing
the Islamic faith may be governed by Islami c law in all matters relating to matrim onial
property" .12I
2.3.3. Hindu Marriages
In the report of the 1968 Commission, the Hindu community made no claim to a .
privileged position arising from the right to freedom of religion under the 1963
Constitution.lf The 1968 Commission remarked that this may have been beca use of the
116 Mulla OF, Principles ofMahoniedan Law, Th acker & Company, Bomb ay, 1905 .
I i i Muigai, 'Women end Property Rights in Kenya' , 116.
li S Commission on the Law of Marri age and Divorc e, Report ofthe Commission 011 the Law ofMarriage and
Divorce, August 1968, 5.
119 Essa I' Essa [1995] LLR 384.
120 Juma & Kanja ma, Family Law Diges t 0 11 Matri monial Prop erty, 30.
121 Section 3, Matrimonial Property Act (No. 49 of 20 13).
122 Com mission on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission 0 11 the Law of Marria ge and
Divorce, August 1968, 6.
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already major interference by statute in Hindu practices 123 at the time of the Commission's
mandate. These interferences include the prior abolition ofpolygamous marriages by Hindus
under the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act,124 and bringing of some Hindu matrimonial
causes under the Matrimonial Causes Act. 125
Nevertheless, som e unique aspects of matrimonial property ansmg from Hindu
marriages are worth noting. Property rights of Hindu women are enshrined in the concept of
stridhana - stri, meaning woman and dhana meaning property.126 A woman may acquire
movable property and immovable property in the form of absolute gifts from many sources.
These sources may inclu de gifts and bequests from relatives, all of which remain
stridliana.V' At the start and throughout her marriage, a Hindu woman retains an enforceable
dominion over her property.P" As such, the Hindu conception of matrimonial property,
especially concerning women, is similar to that which English courts sought to create
thro ugh years ofj urisprudence - that there may be shared matrimonial property , yet a woman
may also hold property of her own exclusively during the marriage. This arrangement of
property ownership ma y relate back to the comments of the 1968 Commission; the Hindu
community like y did not object to the Commission's recommendations sinc e they did not
perc eive any encroachment on their personal law in its exi sting form .129
2.3.4. Christian and Civil M arriages
Christian and Civil maniages in Kenya began with the Marriage Act of 1902 .130 The
forma lities of the Act were later simplified for locals thro ugh the Native Christian Marriage
Ordinance.l " and the African Christian Marriage and Divorce Act. 132 In these marriages, it
wasenv isi oned that the persona ity of the woman was absorbe::l into he- husband's.133 The
. 123 Commissio n on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Report ofthe Commission on the L(/II' ofMarriageand
Divorce, August 1968, 6.
1 2~ Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act (LN 14211 963, LN 2/ 1964) .
125 Matrimonial Causes Act (Act No. 33 of 1939).
126 M uigai, ' W omen end Property Rights in Kenya ' , 115.
127 M uigai, 'Women end Property Rights in Kenya' , 115.
12S Mui gai , ' W omen end Property Rights in Kenya' , 115.
129 Commissio n on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage and
Divorce, August 1968, 6.
130 Murriage Act (Act No. 30 of 1902).
131 Native Christian Marriage Ordinance (No. 9 of 1904).
132 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Act (Ac t No. 51 of 1931).
133 Kiage, Family Law in Kenya : Marriage, Divorce and Children, 242.
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result was that property she could hold outside marriage as s fe mme sole become part of her
husbcnd's property. Thereater, shecould not sell or gift the property without his conS81t. 134
However, the position has undergone substanti al changes. The case of I v [ 135 applied
the Maried Wom61's Property Act of 1882 (MWPA) in K61ya as a statute of general
application und er Section 3 of the Judicature Act. Moreover, the High Court held that the
Act ranked higher than customary law when applied to Kenya.136 The MWPA' s removal of
a husband's interest in his wife's propety' P was the genesis of the modem position in
Chri stian and Civil marri ages, in which a wife maintains her ability to dispose ofher personal
property without interference from her husband . Through J v [ /3 8 interpretations of the
principles of matrimonial property under the MWPA enunciated by the Hou se of Lords
decisions in Pettit v Pettit l 39 and Gissing v Gissing'l" were thus applicable to Kenya.
Petite v Pettit was among the earl y found ational cases on matrimonial property.
Among the key findings of the case was that the role of the court is merely to determine the
exis ting property rights between spouses.':" Therefore, a judge cannot vary such rights even
where successive events wou ld make the alloca tion appear unfair. The court cannot grant a
party legal title to prop erty that the party did not already have title to.141 Fur ther, the court
stated that the fact of marriage does not automatically result in co-ownership of property,
granting one spo use immediate interest in property of the other. 1-1 3
Another foundational case, Gissing v Gissing,14-1 inquired into whether a spouse can
acquire an interest in the property of the other during the marri age. Thi s was of importance
in the case, as the matrimonial home was solely in the name of the husband . The wife did
however make indir ect contributions to the purchase by relieving the husband of other
household cos ts such that he could focus on paying off the cost of the home.l'" Strictly
applying the rules in Pettit v Pettit , meant that the wife may be effectively disp osed of her
134 Kiage , Family Law in Kenya: Marria ge, Divorce and Children, 242 .
135 f v f [1970] EA 27 86.
136 f v f [197 0] EA 2786.
I3i Kiage , Fami ly Law in Kenya: Marriage, Divorce and Children, 244.
us f v f [1970] EA 2786 .
139 Pettit v Pettit [1969] All ER 2.
140 Gissing v Gissing [1970 ] All ER 78 0.
141 Pettit v Pettit [1969} All ER 2.
14~ Pettit v Pettit [1969 ] All ER 2.
143 Pettit v Pettit [1969] All ER 2.
144 Gissing v Gissing [1970] All ER 78 0.
1·1; Gissing v Gissing [1970] All ER 78 0.
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light to at least part of the home. However, Lord Reid held that a spouse could acquire
interest by making both direct, and indirect financial contributions as the wife did.!"
Moreover, where the property is in the name of one of the spouses, a resulting trust is
created. 147 The trust is formed when the legal owner of the property acts or induces another,
spouse or stranger, to believe that they are acquiring an interest in the property.148
These principles were brought to Kenya through the general application of the
MVVPA, and continued in cases like Kivuitu v Kivuitu. 149 In this case it was held that where
property is held in the joint names of the spouses, unlike in Gissing, it is assumed that the
property is held in equal shares. 150 Moreover, where both spouses have made contributions
to the acquisition of the property in addition to holding the property jointly, they are said to
have acquired an interest in the property. Herethe term II contri bution" was aI S) expended.
It was held to extend to more than simply monetary contributions - direct or indirect. 151 The
court held that the carrying on of household duties by the wife in a typical African household
amounted to non-financial contribution, granting an interest in the acquired matrimonial
property.152 This expanded definition appears to be an extrapolation of the holding in Gissing
on indirect contribution. The contribution is indirect since the payment of other hous ehold
expenses such as electricity by one spouse relieves the other spouse who may then focus on
paying the rent or cost o f the matrimonial home. In Kivuitu , a wife completing household
duties contributes to the home by relieving the husband of those same duties. l' " Therefore ,
the husband can expend his energies in business, or acquisition of assets. Such assets are
thus family property since they were acquired by joint efforts within the home - the wife
working household duties freeing the husband to take up such activities.
2.4. Modern Framework of Matrimonial Property Law in Kenya
The modem framework of matrimonial property begins with the 20 I0 Constitution.
Article 45 is dedicated to the family which is recognised as the fundamental unit of society
and is to enjoy the protection of the State .P" In relation to marriage, the Constitution provides
1-16 Gissi ng I' Gissing [ 1970] All ER 780.
1-17 Gissing I' Gissing [19 70] All ER 78 0.
I-IS Gissing I' Gissing [1970] All ER 78 0.
1-19 [1991] KLR 248.
150 Kivu itu I' Kivuitu [/99/] KLR 248.
151 Kivuitu v Ki vuitu [ /99 /] KLR 248.
1 5~ Kivuitu v Kivu itu [ / 99 /] KLR 248.
153 Kivuitu V Kivuitu [/99/] KLR 248.
15-1 Arti cle 45(1), Constitution ofKenya 2010.
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that parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of marriage, during the
marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage. 155 This is particularly important considering
the desire of dishonest spouses to frustrate the matrimonial property rights of their former
spouse at the dissolution of the marriage. This importance of protecting the equality of the
spouses is elevated by Article 68(c)(iii) which calls for legislation to protect matrimonial
property during and at the end of a marriage, most especially the matrimonial home. The
protection envisioned in this provision is applicable not only to third parties outside the
marriage, but also as a measure of safety between the spouses where one may be in danger
of being excluded from matrimonial property. This is especially important in the Kenyan
context where women have often been the targets of cultural discriminatory practices that
alienate them from their share in matIimonial property.P " These provisions and further
supported by Article 27 of the Constitution which provides that all are equal before the
law ,157 and that women and men have the right to equal treatment. ISS Article 27 embodies
Ari stotl e5 concepti on of justi ceasequaity beforethe Ie«.
The Matrimonial Property Ac tl59 was enacted in 2013 to discharge Parliament's
mand ate to enac t legi slation that recognises and protects matrimonial property, especially
the matrimon ial home. lo ll Under the Matrimonial Property Act , the matrimonial hom e or
hom es, household goods and effects in the matrimonial hom e or homes, and any other
immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired during the subsistence of the
marriage all form part o f matrimonial property. 161 Trust property: including property in
customary trusts, is however excluded.l 'v The ownership of matrimonial property vested in
the spouses according to each spouses ' contribution towards its acquisition, and is to be
divided according to such contribution upon the dissolution of the marriage. 163 The word
II contribution" is given specific meaning under Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act,
and codifies the sentiments of Om ollo JA in Kivuitu v Kivuitu.i '" Contribution is both
155 Article 45 (3) , Constitut ion of Kenya 20 10.
156 Kimani EN & Maina LW, ' Older Women's Rights to Property and Inheritance in Kenya: Culture, Policy ,
and Disenfranchisement', 258.
lSi Art icle 27( I), Constitution of Kenya 20 IO.
ISS Article 27(3), Constitution of Kenya 2010.
159 (Act No. 49 of 20 13).
160 Article 68( c)(i ii), Constitution ofKeny a 20 10.
16 1 Secti on 6(1) , Matrim onial Propert y Act (Act No. 49 of 2013) .
162 Section 6(2), Matrimonial Property Ac t (Act No. 49 of 20 13).
163 Section 7, Matrim onial Property Act (Act No. 49 or2013).
164 [1991] KLR 248.
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monetary and non-monetary and defined to include: domestic work and management of the
matrimonial home, child c.:are, companionship, management of family business or property,
and farm work. The Matrimonial Property Act mainly describes the community of property
regime, but also pro vides for a separate property regime. Section 6(3) allows for property
rights to be predefined by prenuptial agreements, while Section 13 allows spouses to
separately own property to which they are entitled to, for example, inherited property.
The meaning of equa lity under Article 45 of the Constitution has been interpreted to
mean that II each partner...walk[s] aNCf'j with what he'shedeserves, What onedeserves [is]
arrived at by considering her/his respective co ntribution whet he r it be monetary or non-
monetary" . 165 This interp retation resemblES Ar istotl e and RaNI s' notion of j usti ce end
fairnes s that f01111 the theoretical fram ework of the study. Aristotle proposed that fairness
encompassed an Idea of equality, to give a specific example, equality before the law despite
any differen ce betwe en two persons.166 Th e difference is crucial in the African context where
gender has caused women to face discrimination through cultural practices. 167 To Rawl s,
fairne ss is taken to be foundational, and a precursor to forming the principles o f justice.168
The foundati onal nature of fairness to the parties should therefore always be a t the forefront
o fthe decision s made by Ken yan co ur ts.
The decision of the High Court in U'M'M v IkIA;f, 169 reflected this understanding of
j ustice and fairne ss, and conformed with the provisions of Section 2, 6 and 7 of the
Matrimonial Prop erty Act. In its j udgement, the Hig h Court in UiV/M v IiV/M I 70 was guided
by the statements by the COLHt of Appeal in Agnes Naujala William v Jacob Petrus Nicolas
Vander Goes, / 7/ which made its j udgemen t before the Matrimonial Property Act was pas sed.
The Court of Appea l stated that:
II Ar tide 45(3) of the Constitution provides that parties to a marriage are ent itled to
equal rights at the time of the marriage during the marriage and at the dissolution
of the marriage. This article clearly gives both parties 10 a marriage equal
165 Wv/J'vl II IMA,I [2014] eKLR, para 21.
166 Solomon and Murphy, What is Jus tic e, 39.
167 Kimani EN & Maina LW, ' Older Women's Rights to Property and Inheritance in Kenya: Culture, Policy,
and Disenfr anchisement' , 259.
16S Sen A, The Idea a/Justice, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 20 I0, 55.
169 [2014] eKLR.
170 [2014] eKLR .
17 1 [20 11 ] Civil Appeal No.127
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rights..[which]arguably extends to matrim onial property and is a constitutional
statement of the principle that marital property is shared 50-50 in the event that a
marriage ends. However pursuant to Article 68 parliament is obligated to pass laws
to recognize and protect matrim onial prop erty, particularly the matrimon ial
home" ./72
Without clarificati on on the law by Parliament, the Courts held that matrimonial property
holding to be 50-5 0 when guided only by the Constitution. The Matrimonial Property Ac t
however, ensures that spousa l contributions are only limited to the contribution they make
to the marriage. The High Co urt in Ui\;!J"\;! v 1i\;fJ.VlI 73 justified the new position set by
Parliament by noting that :111 au tomatic 50 :50 sharing could imp eril the marriage institution
by giving opportunity to a fo rtune seeker to contrac t a marri age , sit back without making
any monetary or non-moneta ry contribution , distress the union and wait to reap half the
marital property.l?"
7 -_.::l. What Constitutes Matrimonial Property in Kenya
The cont ents of matri monial propert y are set out definiti vely in Sect ion 6(1) or the
Mat rimonial Propeny Act. These items are thus what may be divided between the parties
upon the conc lus ion of a marriage through divorce. A furth er point of interest is Section 6(2)
which provides that property held in a trust of any form does not form part of matrimonial
propert y. To date two main classifica tions of matrimoni al property, remain. These are:
2.5.1. Community ofProperty
The first system , community of property - communion bonorum, is born out of civil
law.175 Th e system provides that all property is jointly held by both spouses from the
beginni~g o f the marriage.176 There also ex ist qua si-community of property systems where
property acquired during a marriage does not become jointly held property simply by virtue
o f rnarriage.l" However, quasi-community of property system s act as exc eptions to the
general mle. Under community of property, any prop erty acquired during marriage is joint ly
m Agnes Nanja la William vJacob P CIJ"/lS Nic olas Vander Goes [2011] Civi l Appea l No 127 .
173 [20 14] e KLR.
17-1 [2014] e KLR, para 2 1.
175 Kari uki F et ai, Properly Law, Strathmo re Unive rsity Press, Na irobi, 2016 , 26 1.
176 Kariuki F et ai , Property Law, 26 1.
177 Kariuki F et ai, Property Law, 261 .
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held , as it is said to be a product of the effort of both spouses.!" Essentially, this should
promote the equality of the parti es . Following the theoretical framework of the study, the
theory of fairness would dictate that no one gende r should be granted the upper hand to
property that has been acquired by joint efforts. N either the law, nor any de f acto situation
should be permitted to allow one spouse, for example the husband, greater or exclusive rights
to what the wife also made equal effo rts in acquiring .
Where monetcry contributions are concerned the 'joint Effort' is manifestly visible
and more so quantifiable. Yet what is more common is the case of wives who sta y at home
completing dom estic tasks. A wi fe in such a position is said to have contributed to the
acquisi tion of suc h property as muc h as her employe d husband .179 Omoll o JA was of this
opinion in the key case of Kivuitu v Kivll itll lSOfinding tha t a wife who carries on domestic
tasks canno t be sa id to depend so lely on the chari ty of the husband in the acquisit ion o f
property in marriage ,
Th e system was designed to foster family unity, so lidarity, and equa lity between
spouses.!" and as much can be gathered from the interpre tations in law discussed above.
However, the husband generally had an abso lute pre-eminence over the wife in prop erty
ow nership.P'' Th e separate ow nership sys tem was then born to redress the imba lance in the
legal sys tem. IS]
2.5.2. Separate Property
The seco nd sys tem of separate prop ert y - separa tion bonorum advoca tes for a total
separation of private property in marri age, Th e fact of marriage will have no effec t on the
pre-ex isting property rights of the spouses .F" This is generally done through prenuptial
ag reements. The righ ts remain unal tered between the part ies, and with third part ies .ISS This
system favours certainty in the property rig hts of the spouses, whi ch ma y be determined at
any point in time of the m31Tiage .IS6 The sys tem does not seek to foster the equality o r
17S Kariuki F et al, Property l.aw, 261 .
179 Kariuki F et ai, Prop erty Law, 26 \ .
ISO [ \ 99\ ] KLR 248.
lSI Juma K & Kanjama C, Family Law Digest on Mat rimo nial Prop erty, Law Africa Publishing (K) Ltd,
Nairobi , 2009 ,2.
I S~ Juma & Kcnjama, Fam ily Law Digest on Matrimonial Property , 2.
IS3 Juma & Kanjarna, Family Law Digest 0 11 Matrimonial Prop erty , 2.
IS4 Kiage, Family Law in Kenya: Marriage, Divorce and Children , 246.
IS5 Kiage, Family Law ill Kenya : Marriage, Divorce and Childre n, 246 .
IS6 Jurna & Kanja rna, Family Law Dig est on Matrimo nial Prop erty, 3.
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fairness between the parties promoted by this study, but instead seeks to escape the
possibility of having to share property by maintaining legal distance between the estates of
the spouses.
2.6. Adequacy of Kenya's Legal System
2.6.1. The issue of Trusts
Kenya s Iega system cppea-s to beunabl e to dEB with matri moniaI propertyhidden
in trusts . If presented with the issue in Badenli orst v Badenhorst, / 87 Kenyan courts wou ld
face difficulty in reso lving the issue. In Badenhorst v Badenhorst, the question before the
court was whether trust property that the husband controlled as a trustee should be
considered part of his personal estate and thus subject to distribution when dividing
matrimonial property between the former spouses.I ss Section 6(1) of the Matrimonial
Property Act lS9 would exclude the consideration of trust property when determining what is
considered part of matrimonial property. The Section states that II trust property, including
property held in trust under customary law , does not form part of matrimonial property" .190
Th is would clearly lim it the rights of former spo uses to matrimoni al property where
thei r dishonest counterpart has hidden it in a trust. Moreover, land that ma y be held as
matrimonial property faces fu rther imp ediments. Amo ng the ove rrid ing interests on land are
trusts, including customary trusts. '?' Thus, when land that was matrimonial prop erty is
hidden in a trust, the trust becomes an overr iding interest over a former spouse' s registe ed
interest, or acquired interest under Section 93 . Enforcement of the provisions of the Land
Registration Ac t could therefore result in the dise nfranchise ment of an innocen t spo use . The
aspect of customary trust land may also be used to discriminate against, and disenfranch ise
women. The Land Registration Act also provides that if a spouse obtains an interest in land
during the subsistence o f a marriage for the co-ownership and use of both spo uses, then the
property is deemed matrimonial property and shall be dealt with under the Matrimonial
Property Act. ln However, it is uncl ear wh ether the overriding interests of trusts and
customary will also supersede the provisions of the Matrimonia l Prop er ty Act where a
spouse obtains an interest in land during the marriage.
l Si Badenhorst I' Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) .
ISS Badenhorst I' Badenh orst r:'006 ] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) , para I .
IS9 (No. 49 of 20 13).
190 Section 6(2), Matrimo nial Prop erty Act (No . 49 of 20 13).
191 Section 28, Land Registration Act (Act No 3 of2012).
1 9~ Section 93, Land Registration Ac t (Act No 3 of2012).
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2.6.2. The issue of Companies
The Companies Act of Kenya provides that natural persons may incorporate as
entities with perpetual succession.193 Thi s entity is considered separate and distinct form the
persons constituting it. 194 Ma trimo nial laws in Kenya make no speci fic men tion of marital
property held in companies. Th ere may exist remedies for claims made by inno cent spouses
to matrimonia l property hidden in companies under Kenyan company law. The Companies
Act, allows Kenyan courts to appoint an inspector to inves tigate and report on the affairs of
a company whered rcumstences sugge:;t that the company's busi ness is be ng conducted for
a fraudulent or unlawful purpose .195 However an application for investigati on may only be
made by memb ers of a company.196 Furt her, whe re dishonest spouses attempt to hide behind
the cover of a company, Section 134 of the Companies Act provides safeguards for the
transparency of companies. Companies are to keep thei r register of direc tors open for
inspection at their regis tered office, during ordinary business hours, for inspection by
members at no cost, or by any other person upon payment of a prescr ibed fee .197 Part ies
denied this right have recourse to the courts. 198 It can be noted from these two provisions
that although an aggrieved spouse can show that his or her dishonest spo use is a director on
a compan y under Section 134, they cannot apply for investigations of fraudulent use of the
company under Secti on 786 to support their claim that matrimonial property is being hidden.
Kenyan case law further provides more guidance on any finding of a fraudulent use of a
company. In China Wu Yi Company Ltd v Edermann Property Ltd & 2 Others l 99 the court
held tha t the "veil of incorporation could not be liftEd as against.. .unless there WEre
allegati onsof fraud brought by the PI anti ff " .200
2.7. Conclusion
Post-independence Ke nya has ma inly relied on its courts to form ulate its matrimonial
property framework. Few legislative changes took place befo re the Matrimo nial Property
Act, and the Maniage Act of. Thi s allowed the law to develop in a flexibl e manne r as cour ts
could adapt to past or emerging matrimonial property issues on a case by case basis. The
1 9~ Section 2, Companies Act (Act No. 17 of 20 15).
19. Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, p 27.
19; Section 787 (2)(a) (i), Companies Act (Act I o, 17 of 20 15).
196 Section 786 (1) , Companies Act (Act No. 17 of 2015 ).
197 Sectio n 134(4) , Companies Act (Act No. 17 of 20 15).
19S Secti on 134(5) and 134(6), Companies Act (Act No. 17 of 20 15).
199 (20 13) eKLR.
200 China W/( Yi Company Ltd I' Ederniann Propert y Ltd & 2 Ors (20 13) eKLR .
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Matrimonial Property Act therefore only serves as an interim codification of the
development of the law so far.
The case law demonstrates that courts have been cont inually guided by the idea of
justice that forms the basis of this study. The developments in jurisprudence have always
resulted from questioning whether a particular decision by the court would be fair and equal
between the parties.
The next chapter will exam me the motivations and methods used by disho nest
spouses to hide matrimonial property in companies and trusts. These will be largely
comparative due to the greater experience of South African and Eng lish jurisdictions in
resol vi nq this issue. The chaptff will f urther analysewhether Kenya s legal f ramework, as
it has developed so far, is adequately equipped to respond to the legal issues demo nstrated
in the comparative jurisdictions, South Africa and England.
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CHAPTER THREE:
Hiding of Matrimonial Property in Trusts and Companies
3.1. Introduction
This chapter considers cases ill which dishonest spouses have hide property in
companies and trusts . Using examples from case law in South Africa and England, it
examines the methods of hiding property in trusts and companies respectively and the
moti vations for such methods prior to and during divorce proceedings. It further makes
comparisons of similar occurrences in Kenya where any have been found.
3.2. Hiding Matrimonial Property in Trusts
The issue of hidden property in companies and trusts has arisen most frequently in
South Africa. More specificall y, it has concerned the use of trusts by spouses. Francois du
Toit notes that in the South African conception of a trust, there exists: "a functional
SEparation between trustees' control OVff the trust property on the one hand , and trust
beneficiary's enjoyment of the benefits yielded by that control on the other hand" .201Th is
is much like the conception of trusts appli ed in Kenya. Under Kenyan trust law, the settlor
charges the trustee to hold property for the benefit of the beneficiary. P" The beneficiary hold
this right in equity.203 Thi s creates a separation between legal ow nership, or control, of the
property by the trustee, and beneficial ownership or enjoymen t by the beneficiary.20~As such,
trust property is:
u in prind pie, exduded from thedete rn nation of the...consequences of that divorce.
The...consequeoces of thedivorce impacton thedivorcing spouses' personal estates,
or, in the case of a marriage in corrrrunity of property, on the spouses' joint
estate .2115
This understanding of the separation between marital property and trust property is generall y
in line with the provision of Section 6(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act206ofKenya which
20 1 Toit F, ' So uth Africa - Tru sts and the Patrimonial Co nsequence s of Divorce: Recent Development s in So uth
Africa' Jo urna l of Civi l L(/\I' Studies (2015), 656.
202 Warner-Reed, Equity and Trusts, 15.
20, Warner-Reed, Equity and 7i-tIStS, 15.
2Q.l Warner-Reed , Equity and Trusts , 15.
205 Toit F, ' So uth Africa - T rust s and the Patri monia l Consequences of Divorce: Recent Developmen ts in South
Africa' , 657.
206 Ac t No. 49 of 201 3.
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states: "trust property, induding property held in trust under custorna'y law , does not form
pat of matrimonia property" .207
Surprisingly however, this position has been challenged in South African courts. The
challenges arise when:
" the trust form is erployed not to separate trust cenetlciaries bmefidal interest
from trustees' control ove- trust property, but rather to pernt eve-ything to rerai n
' as before'. This occurs typically when a trust's trustees are also among the
beneficiaries of that trust or, stated differently, when some ofthe trust ben eficiaries
control the self-sametrust as its trustees" .20S
Essentiall y, whe n pe rso ns se t up a trust suc h that they enjoy both co ntro l and enjoyment of
the property, South African courts refer to such trusts as " elter-eqo trust[ s]" .209
Amo ng the leading cases tha t demo nstrate this lack of sepa ra tion between control
and enjoyment of trust assets is Jordaau v Jo rdaa n.21U In the case the defendan t was a trustee
of land transferred to a tru st by his moth er for the sake of es tate planning aimed at reduc ing
or avoiding estate du ties on his death.I!' The defend an t was not a beneficiary o f the trust.
Yet due to his co ntro l as a trustee, the co ur t found that the defendant continu ed to treat the
farm and the rental income of the trust as his ow n in a ll but name.212 The Jordaan v
Jordaair '? case dem onstrates one o f the reasons behind the creation of a trust, as well as
subse que nt abuse by ignoring the contro l-enjoyment separa tio n.
However , the issue of abuse to specifically hide or cut off a former spo use from
matrimoni al prop ert y was seen in Jo rdaan v Jo rdaan and 3 Others.t !" Thi s case arose from
simi lar fac ts as Jordaan v Jo rdaan and involved the same. former spouse s. It was not ed in
Jordaan v Jordaan and 3 Others that bo th spo uses we re trustees of the Johannes Jordaan
T rus t ("the JJ Trust ") and the Groothoek T rus t ("the OH Trust") .215 In the lat ter Jordaan case
it is revealed that the husband forma lly removed the wife as a trustee of both trus ts as soon
as the marriage relationship came to an end . Well after the marriage, the hu sban d co ntinued
~07 Section 6(2) , Matrim onial Property Act (Ac t No. 49 of 20 13).
zos Toit F, .South Africa - Trusts and the Patrimonial Consequences of Divorce: Recent Developm ents in South
Afr ica' , 657, See aso Land and Agricultural Balik ofSouth Africa v. Parker , 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 26.
~09 Corrrnssioner for Inland Revenue v Pick ' n Pay Errployee S1are Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) 59F.
~ IO Jordaan \' Jordaan [2001] (3) SA 288 (C).
~I I Iord aan v Jordaan [2001] (3) SA 288 (C) para 44.
~I~ }ordaall v Jordaan [2001] (3) SA 288 (C) para 44.
~ " Jordaan v Jordaan [2001] (3) SA 288 (C) para 44.
~ 14 Jordaan vJordaan and 3 Others [2012] He.
~ 1 5 Jordaa n v Jorda an and 3 Others [2012] HC, para 5.
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to treat tmst property as his own, using the JJ Trust to pay his personal debts pertaining to
the divorce settleme nt with his wife and for his personal ma intenance obligations. Moreover,
the husband's Iiqui dati on of the trust funds mede it impossi ble for the trust to repay loans it
owed to his wife.
3.2.1. Occurrences ofMatrimonial Property held in Tru sts in Kenya
No jurisprudence in Kenya so far suggests whe ther Section 6(1) is to apply strictly or
flexibl y, and no cases have dealt directl y with this issu e. However, som e inferences of
property hidden in trusts may be inferred. In the 2015 case RPlvf v P f(J'/f,216 the respondent
was the son of the former president of Kenya, and by all acco unts given by his former wife ,
lived a high standard life during their marriage. In this case involving ma intenance however,
the court had this to observe:
" unlike the Pet itione, the Respo ndent has not been forthcomi ng about wha t heowns;
his testimony has been inconsistent, less than candid, and \Vas an exercise by the
Respondent ofconcealment ofmaterial fa cts and inf ormationfrom the court. Indeed,
the Respondent denied ownership of allproperties associated with him, claiming that
they belonged to hisfather, his sister, his fa mily. hisfriends , or people not known to
him. While doubt \I 'os cast to many a/his responses during the hearing, he did not
seek to support his claims with convincing evidence. The only conclusion that this
court reache:l.. .is that the Re:pondslt is a person of substantial means and of
substantial income who has over time perfected the art of concealing what he
actual Iy owns" .2/7
Although the court did not del ve furth er into how the respondent concealed his prop erty and
whether it had powers to make orders for maintenance regardless, some points of interest
may be drawn here. First, the respondent had been separated fro m his wife for 5 years before
the above case began . It is plausibl e to conclude , as the court did, that he had found ways to
hide his property to protect himself from such a suit. Second, any prop erty associat ed with
him was apparently owned by relatives and friends. This sugge sts he may have employed
trusts to hide his property . By making friends and relat ives trustees, he could not be said to
be the legal owner of any of his property but may sti ll enjoy use of the same. If the trusts are
employe d effective ly, he may in law d aim that he truly "owns noth ing" . lndeed, he sta ted
betcre the' cour: that "he was literall y a paup er dependant on the goodwill of his
216 [2015] eKLR.
2 17 RPAI V PKM [20 15] eKLR, p 10.
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rdetives.. .[end] that [the] court should not accord him special treatment on account of his
surncme" .21S
However, this case may be disting uished in tha t it concerned an order for
maintenance and not distribution of matrimonial property. In the former, the court need on ly
ascertain what is a fair amount given the facts before it, while in the later, the applicant has
a right to the property and so the court may have delved further to discover its whereabouts
and det ermine which orders it can make. Another distinction that may be made is that the
respondent did not seek to control the property in the trust as a trustee, but rather may have
se ttled the trusts with friends and fami ly members as trustees, and have himsel f as the legal
beneficial owner of the trust property. Thus he may have been able to sustain himself whil e
Effective y "owning nothi ng" by having no Iega! ownership to his own properties.
3.3. Hiding Matrimonial Property in Companies
The use of a company to hid e matrimonial property is di scu ssed in the UKSC case
of Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and Others. l !" In the case, the husband owned the
company Pe trodel Resources Limited (PRL) that held lega l tit le to the matrimonial home .
Here the acti ons of the husband were complicated on two fronts. First, he attempted to
co nceal his ownership and co ntro l o f the compan y PRL, and second the court had to cont end
whet her orders for red istribution of matrim onial property coul d be made against the
co mpany, a sepa rate legai entity. The seco nd issue is of particular interest , bringin g together
elements of company law and family law .
The UKSC held that as a genera l ru le , no orders cou ld be made aga inst PRL for the
actions of the husband due to the rule in Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd220 - that at law , a
company is a sep arate person form its shareho lde rsv" . The cour t found that the rule app lied
even whe re the co mpany was ow ned or controlled by one person. 222 The issue o f othe r
shareho lders is key since an asset, such as the matrimonial home in question , belonging to
the company is meant to generate profits for all shareholde rs.
A similar case appeared before the fami ly divis ion of the English co urt s. In Ben
Hash em v AI Shay!f,223 the wife soug ht the transfer of a propert y she occupied. She alleged
218 RPivl If PKM [2015] eKLR, p 9.
2 19 [20 13] UKSC 34.
220 [1897] AC 22.
221 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, p 27.
222 Prest If Petrode/ Resources Limit ed and others [20 13] UKSC 34,23.
223 [2009] 1 FLR 115.
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that the property was ow ned by a company controlled by the husband. The case provides the
same issues as before. Although the husband was less concealed in terms of his control of
the company, the separation between the husband as owner or controller and the company
itself still provided a legal issue. To S3l:isfy thewife's request for trcnsfe- would be to strip
away the rights of the company - and by ex tension its shareholders, while to ignore it would
be to deny her rights to the whole or at least part of the property as a spouse. Moreover,
Munby J who he<!rd the Bell Hashem case was also on the bench in the Chancery divis ion of
the English cour ts in which the same company of the Bell Hashem case sought orders for
possession of the same property that the wife brought a cas e for. 224
3.3.1. Occurrences ofMatrimonial Property held ill Companies in Kenya
The issue has also not come up in Kenya with respect to companies. Although no
specific provision of the law may hinder the COUl1s from dispensing justice, Kenyan courts
will still face the same banier between family law and company law as experienced ill
England. The Com panies Ac t of Kenya provides that natural persons may incorp orate as
entities with perp etual succession.F" Sinc e the company is a legal entity, there arises a
qu estion as to whic h rights should preva il with respect to the matrim on ial property
concerned. The right s a t' the former spo use, or the rights o f the compa ny and its respective
shareholders. Eith er side has some claim to the matrimonial property. This dual claim to the
property is amo ng the main consid erations d iscussed in the next Chap ter, where courts
justify piercing the co rpo rate ve il.
3.4. Conclusion
Courts are unli kely to simply leave app licants unsati sfied simply because of conflic ts
between differing areas of law. Ch apter four will discu ss the approaches made by cour ts in
South Africa with respect to trusts holding matrimonial property, and the approaches of
English courts wit h resp ect to companies holding mat rim oni al prop erty. Th ese approaches
will then inform the fina recorrmendations that could bolster Kenya's ability to resolve
s imi lar issues .
22-1 Prest l' Petrodel Resources Limited and others [20 13] UKSC 34, 25.
225 Sec tion 2, Companies Act (Ac t No. 17 of 20 15).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Spousal Claims to Property in Trusts and Companies, and Judicial
Justifications for Going Behind the Trust or Piercing the Corporate Veil
4.1. Introduction
This chapter considers the possible claims the iooocent spouse may have to
matrimonial property hidden behind trusts and companies as outlined in the previous chapter.
It furth er investigates the jurisprudential arguments and circumstances that allow South
African and English courts to go behind trusts , or to pierce the corporate veils of companies,
respectively, to settle claims by the innoc ent spouse.
4.2. Going Behind the Trust Form
Where an ideal trust is set-up there exis ts a separation between the right ofow nership
and the right of enjo yme nt of the property. The right s of owne rship and contro l are vested in
the trustee while the right of enjoyme nt is granted to the beneficiary of the trust.226 However,
in most cases where a dishonest spouse, acting as trus tee, wishes to hide matrimonial
property, there is often an attempt to maint ain both rights of control and enjoyment. In th is
latter set-up the:
" trusteecontrols the trust affairs with sef-illterest and with all litter disregard / or
the existence of the trust as a separate estate ill which the trust beneficiaries are
bErlefi dai Iy interested: the trust is nothing but the trustee'salter-ego" .227
This type of action is seen in the Badenliorst and Jordaan cases. The South African Supreme
Court of Appeal (SASCA) held that once this is discovered, the court may be allowed to find
that" the trust form is a V618ff that in j usti ceshaul d bepie ced" .228
Author De Waa l identifies key principles often violated by trustees, prompting courts
to look into the trust: (i) the duty to exercise independence of judgment and indep endent
discretion; (ii) the duty to give effect to the trust deed, properl y interpreted; (iii) and the
principle that trustees must act with care , diligence and skill in the performance of their
duti es and the exercise of their powers.229 A failure to adhere to these principles essentially
amounts to an abuse of the trust. Du To it argues that the joint-action rule, which requires co-
~~ 6 De Wa3I MJ, 'The A buse of the Trust (or: "Going Behind the Trus Form" )' , 11.
~2 7 Toit F, ' South Africa - Trusts and the Patrim onial Consequencesof Divorce: Recent Developments in South
Africa', 658.
228 Land and Agricultural Balik 0/South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3.
229 De Wa3I MJ, 'The Abuse of the Trust (or : "Going Behind the Trust Form")', 18.
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trustees to always act jointly, can be added to this list.D O The importance of joint action as
part of South Afri can trust law was noted in the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa
v Parker and Others23! case, where it was said that actions made by the trustee without
meetings or consultation of other co-trustees amounts to an abuse of the trust form .
However, an important distinction must be made here between claims where propert y
is hidden in trusts, and when it is hidd en in companies as wi ll be discuss ed below . The Land
and Agricultural Bank ofSouth Africa v Parker and Others case refe rred to the trust form as
a "veneer to be pie-ce::l". 232 This idea makes a trust look like a company in law, but as the
SASC A clarified, in Badenhorst v Badenhorst: "strictly speaking it is incorrect to refer to a
trust as a I SEParate IS]a1 enti ty'" .233 The SASCA in Badenhorst cited Commissioner fo r
Inland RevEnue v MacNei IIies Estatel34 where it was state d that" neither our authorities nor
our Courts have rega rded it as a persona or entity...It is trite law that the asse ts and liabilities
ina trust vest in the trustee' . Therefore, where trusts are conce rned , there is no veil between
the trust, and the trustee, whose control permits the possibility ofabuse, and the trust. Control
of the property is vested in the trustee, although enjoyment of the prop erty belongs to the
beneficiary. An abuse of the trust form exists where the trustee attempts to have both
enjoyment and cont rol as if he fu lly owned the property. The court thus comes in to
deterni ne whether such abuse warrants consi dering the trust property as the trusteesown
property where an action is brought against the trustee.
The SASCA determined that unl ike in companies where the first assumption must
be that the company and the dishonest spouse are separate, " the rne-e fact that the assets
vested in the trustees and did not form partof the respondent's estate does not perseexdude
them from considera tion when determining what must be considere d when ma king a
redi stribution orde" .235
Moreover, the court held that abuse of the trust form is the key to the success of an
innocent spouses claim. The court held that:
" to succeed ina cI aim that trust assets beincluded in the estate of oneof the parties
to a marriage there needs to be evidence that [the dishonest] party controlled the
~30 Toit F, ' South Africa - Trusts and the Patrimoni al Consequences of Divorce : Recen t Developments in South
Africa' , 666 .
~3 1 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para 15.
~3 ~ Land and Agri cultural Bank ofSouth Afric a 1'. Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SeA), para . 37.3.
m [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA), para 8.
~34 1961 (3) SA 833 (A).
~35 Badenhorst v Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 9.
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trust and but fo r the trust would have acquired and owned the assets in his [or her]
own name. Contro l must be de facto and not necessarily de j ure...De j ure control of
a trust is in the hands ofthe trustees but velY often the founder in business or family
trusts appoints close relatives or friends who are either supine or do the bidding of
the r appointer. De facto the founder control s the trust" .236
To decide on defacto and dejure contro l, the court looks through the trust deed and analyses
the trust's administration in comparison for any discrepanci €S. In most C8Se3, the
discrepanc ies arise from violations of the key principles highli ght ed by De Waal and Du
Toit. Such an analysis was taken on both the Baden horst and Jordaan cases.
The Jubl i trust deed in the Badenhorst case was set up as follows: the founder of the
trust was the respondent's fathe-, who appointEd the respondent and his brother as the
trustees. P " The capital beneficiaries of the trust were the issues of any marriage entered by
the respondent.P '' The respondent's forme- wife, the applicant, was an income
beneficiary.P " The rights of the beneficiaries, both inco me and capital, vested on a date to
be determined by the trustees.r" Moreover, the respondent had the right to discharge his co-
trustee and appoint someone else in his place .i"' The trustees had unfettered discretion to do
with the trust assets and income as they saw fit.242 The court found that in practice, the
respondent seldom paid attention to the difference between his own assets and trust assets.
He listed trust asse ts as his own while applying for credit facili ties , and later financed a
property listed in his name using a tm st.243 He also received a subs tantia l monthly incom e
of R50,000 from an Esta te agency, which was who lly cont rolled by a company whose
shareho lding was split 50:50 between the trust and his former wife .244 The court found that
in a maj ori ty of his dec isions as trustee, the respondent rarely consulted his co- trustee giv ing
him, de (acto, total con trol of the tmst.245
From the statement offacts given by the court, it can be seen that the respo ndent had
violated the principles ofa trust given by De Waal and Du Toit. Of the principles highlighted
~36 Badenhorst I' Badenh orst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 9.
237 Badeuhorst I' Badenli orst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 10.
~ 3 S Badenh orst I' Badenh orst [200 6] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 10.
~39 Badenh orst \' Badenh orst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SC A) pa ra 10.
~~o Badeuh orst I' Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 10.
~~I Baden : orst I' Badenh orst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SC A) para 10.
~~ ~ Badenliorst I' Badenh orst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 10.
~43 Badenhorst I' Badenhorst [2006] 2 AI] SA 363 (SC A) para 11.
~4. Badenhorst I' Badenhors t [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 11.
~~5 Badenhorst I' Badenhorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 11.
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by De Wc:a , the respondent fa Ied on all three fronts. By cppl ying for credit us ng the trust's
assets, he sought to indirectly profit from the trust. This interferes with his ability to exercise
independence of judgement and discretion as it is likely to create a conflict of interest
between his duties as trustee, and to his business regarding the credit facility. This is also
true of the R50,OOOmonthly incomes which he was eoleto grcnt himself through the trust ' s
control of the estate agency. By financing a property in his name using the trust , he failed to
properly give effect to the trust deed . As neither a capital nor income beneficiary, he had no
vested right to use the income or capital of the trust for personal means. By failing to
appreciate his role as a trustee, separating his contro l from the enjoyment of trust property,
the respondent did not act with care , diligence and skill in exercising his powers. The joint-
cdion standard set by Du Toit was a so vi01 ated by the respondent' s uniIatera decisions
without sanction or consultation from his co-trustee.
Although the SASCA did not employ a specific ana lysis using the principles above,
it still made a general finding that the actions of the respondent did not align with the purpose
of the trust. It's critical finding was that but for the trust , ownership of the trust assets , in
tenus ofboth control and enjoyment, would have vested in the respondent. As such the Court
held that the defendant would be liable to a court order for redistribution of the property in
the trusr" .
In the Jordaan v Jordaani' ? case , the South African High Court found that the
defendant, acting as trustee, similarly used the trusts as if the property within them was
ves ted in himself. The defendant held a controlling position over the trust through clauses
4.3 and 5 of the trust deed. Through his powers of control, the defendant treated a farm and
other rental income from the trust as personal property by all accounts except in name.i'"
Thus the court held that the farm, should be considered part of the defend ant's personal-
property in divorce proceedings.
The discussions in the South Afr ican Courts abo ut trust property offe r some
guidelines that may be applied by Kenyan courts regarding trust property and matrimonial
property. The y point to the fact that where there is a disregard for the correct legal fo011 of
companies and trusts , dishonest spouses should not be allowed to rely upon them to hide
property.
--------_._-
~46 Badenhorst v Badenliorst [2006] 2 All SA 363 (SCA) para 13.
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4.3. Piercing the Company Corporate Veil
Comp anies have also been used as tools to hide matri monial prop erty. However, the
approach to handl ing claims by innocent spouse with respect to companies differs from the
approach to trusts. As highlighted in the Badenhorst case, trustshaveno "ve I to bepierced" .
The property sought is vested in the trustee, who the action is against. Companies however
separate ownership of the property, from the dishonest spouse, thus keeping it safe from any
action brought against the dishonest spouse .
This presents a challenge to courts since it cannot simply ignore the veil between the
company and the dishonest spouse . Instead, the court must find whether the company
business is being used for a fraudulent purpose, and if so, pierce the vei l and distribut e the
company's property as if it was held by the dishonest spouse.249 As noted in the previous
chapter, the use of companies brings about two distinct issues to a cOUl1 seeking to bring
justice to the innocent spouse. First, the corporate ve il makes it easie r for a dishonest spouse
to concea l their role in the ownership and control of the company concerned. Second , even
where the ownership and control are determined, the court must consider whether it can
make orders against the company to distribute the matrimonial property.
The leading case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and othen/50 recently laid
down the principles to be cons idered before piercing the corporate veil. Before the case
reached the UKSC, the English COUl1 of Appeal set two requirements that must be followed
before company asse ts can be distributed as matrimonial property. First the corporate
personality of the company was abused for some fraudulent purpose, and seco nd on the
part icular facts of the case, it could be shown that an asset legally owned by the compan y
was hEl din trust for the husband" .25 1
Rimer LJ who delivered the leading judgment for the majority in the Court ofAppeal
held that unless these requirements were met, such orders for distribution were beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.
The is an interesting similarity of actions between spouses attempting to hide
matrim onial property in companies, and in trusts . The Court of Appeal found that the
husband in the Prest case:
2~9 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [20 13J UKSC 34, para 34.
250 [2013J UKSC 34.
251 Prest v Petrode/ Resources Limited and others [20 13J UKSC 34, para 7.
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" [had] pesonal exp61dituresubstantially[that] exceeded hissalaryand bonuses as
chief executive, and that the difference was funded entirely by the company. There
wasnoformal ity involved.Thehusbandsif11)1 Ytr €BtOO thecorrpaniEE' cash balances
and property as his own and dreN on then as he saw fit. ..the husband had
I unrEStri cted access' to...assets, unoonfi nOO by any board contro l or by any scruples
about the legality of his drawings. He used PRL' s assets to fund his and his farri Iy's
personal expenditure, including the substantial legal costs incurred in these
proceed ngs...Effective y the husband' s rroneyboxwhiell he uses at wiII" .252
This is reminiscent of the actions of the husb ands in the Badenhorst and Jordaan cases who
not only sought to hide matrim onial property once the marriage cam e to an end, but furth er
treated the property in the trus ts, and company in the Prest case , as their own.
Th e UKSC took a differen t approach from the Court of Appeal in determining
whether the corporate ve I shoul d bepierced. It was of the vie« that a oompany' s ve I may
be pierced where its separate legal personality was being abu sed for some wrongdoing . This
wrongdoing resoltoo in the company be ng athe- a "faccde" or a "sham" - whic h the court
termed as the concealment pr inc iple and the evasion principle respectively.P :' Under the
concealment prin cipl e, the court does not pierce the ve il, but will only look beh ind it to
identify the ow ner or contro ller of the company should their identification be legall y
relevant.P" In the latter, the COUI1 will pierce the vei l where the incorporation of the company
is being used to put lip a veil between a right that is owed so as to defeat or frustra te the
, - -
right.-))
In the case before it, the UKSC looked behind the veil of PRL to det ermine not only
that the husband was the contro ller of the company, wi th almost no accountability to a
board,256 but to further find that the matrimonial hom e in dispu te was held by the company
in trust for the husband and not for any commercia l purposes. The hom e was in fact acquired
by the company before it began any ope rations.P? The court found that the husband was
using the corporate vei l of the compa ny to f rustrate the erforcenent of his forme- wife' s
right to a share in the matrimon ial home.
"5"Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34, para 15.
m Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] Ut: SC 34, para 28.
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The UKSC in deciding whether the company or the spouses rights should prevail,
ci ted Adams v Cape Indu stries plc258 which stated that in deciding whether to pierce the
co rporate vei l, "the court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salom on &
Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 mere y because it consi dersthat j usti ceso requi res" .
Th e UK SC reasoned that due to the nature of company law, justice was not reas on
enough to pierce the veil. It held that the re mu st be some speci fic impropriety that the
dishonest spouse seeks to uphold by concealme nt und er the compa ny, or eva sion by using
the cornpary' S ve I as a detence, It thus concluded that hid ing matrimonial property can be
considered an impropri ety which may justi fy piercing the corporate vei l.
Under Ken yan case law, a similar conclus ion wo uld have been reac hed. In Kolaba
Enterpris e Ltd v Shamsudin Hussein Varvani & Anothe]2 59it was determined that:
II [the] separate legal personality ofa company can never be departed fro nt except
in instances where [he statute or the law p rovides for the lifting ofpiercing of the
corporate veil, say when the directors or members of the company are using the
COIII/KlIly as {/ vehicle to commitfraud"
.l 4.4. Conclusion
.;
Th e cases highli ghted demonstrate that spouses can indeed have claims [ 0 matrimon ial
prope rty hidden in trus ts or com panies. The legal position under Kenyas Matrimonial
Prop erty Act will require ame ndme nt given the argume nts of the SAS CA. The nature of a
trust can easily be ab used by a truste e, and an in flex ible statutory posit ion wi ll only aid his
de'encewherethe rightsof the trustee's spouse arebe ng infrinqed upon.
~ 5 3 [1990] eh 433.
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